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Abstract—In this paper, we propose an accountable privacy
preserving attribute-based framework, called Ins-PAbAC, that
combines attribute based encryption and attribute based signa-
ture techniques for securely sharing outsourced data contents via
public cloud servers. The proposed framework presents several
advantages. First, it provides an encrypted access control feature,
enforced at the data owner’s side, while providing the desired
expressiveness of access control policies. Second, Ins-PAbAC
preserves users’ privacy, relying on an anonymous authentication
mechanism, derived from a privacy preserving attribute based
signature scheme that hides the users’ identifying information.
Furthermore, our proposal introduces an accountable attribute
based signature that enables an inspection authority to reveal
the identity of the anonymously-authenticated user if needed.
Third, Ins-PAbAC is provably secure, as it is resistant to both
curious cloud providers and malicious users adversaries. Finally,
experimental results, built upon OpenStack Swift testbed, point
out the applicability of the proposed scheme in real world
scenarios.
Index Terms—Cloud computing, cloud data sharing, privacy,
attribute based encryption, attribute based signature, account-
ability, encrypted access control
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the widespread adoption of cloud data storage
applications raises several security and privacy issues. That
is, ensuring the secrecy of outsourced data is considered as a
major challenge for cloud clients, due to the loss of data con-
trol [1], [2], [3]. Thus, several solutions have proposed to apply
data encryption at the data owner side, such that the decrypting
keys are preserved out of reach of the cloud provider [4], [5].
Although data encryption ensures the confidentiality of data
against malicious entities, the use of traditional encryption
mechanisms i.e., symmetric and asymmetric encryption is not
sufficient to support fine-grained access control to outsourced
data. On the one hand, access control policies need to be
enforced to ensure flexible and distinguishable data sharing
among users with different privileges. In addition, sharing
data among dynamic groups of users requires an efficient
distribution of deciphering keys between different authorized
users. On the other hand, the involvement of the cloud provider
makes the leakage of access patterns a major issue as it
may disclose users’ private information and even disclose
confidential information about the outsourced data itself [6],
[7]. Consequently, data confidentiality and users’ privacy can
not be ensured if these sensitive data are not protected.
The increasing need for fine-grained access control over
outsourced data while preserving their secrecy led to the emer-
gence of several encrypted access control schemes. Among
these techniques, Attribute based Encryption (ABE) has ap-
peared as a promising cryptographic technique which provides
both confidentiality and fine grained access control to out-
sourced data [8]. ABE consists on encrypting data by the data
owner w.r.t. a defined access policy over a set of attributes.
Consequently, an authorised user who is able to decrypt and
access data is an entity holding a set of attributes satisfying
the access policy.
In this paper, we present Ins-PAbAC, an accountable privacy
preserving attribute-based framework, for an authenticated
encrypted access to data outsourced to cloud servers. The
proposed framework combines Attribute Based Encryption
(ABE) and Attribute Based Signature (ABS) mechanisms,
while considering a two-level access control model. That
is, it introduces (i) fine-grained access control supporting
comprehensive granularity for access rules, and anonymous
data access, allowing the storage server to manage access
requests without any need to learn the user’s identity neither
his attributes.
On one hand, the use of ABE techniques allows the data
owner to restrict access to his outsourced encrypted data to
users that possess the required attributes. Accordingly, the
data owner encrypts the data content w.r.t. an access structure,
such that only users that have a set of attributes, satisfying the
defined access policy, can access to data. Therefore, the data
owner protects his data from unauthorised accesses including
the cloud service provider (CSP) without need to share secret
keys with users.
On the other hand, to avoid non-authorised users from
downloading the data stored in the cloud, we apply an ABS
scheme to verify the users’ access rights. Indeed, the CSP asks
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the user to provide a signature w.r.t. the encryption access
policy defined by the data owner. By verifying this signature,
the CSP ensures that the ciphertext is only downloaded by an
authorised user who is able to decrypt it.
The originality of Ins-PAbAC is multifold. First, the Ins-
PAbAC framework proposes a privacy preserving authentica-
tion feature. That is, based on a novel design of a multi-
authority attribute-based signatures, we ensure anonymous
authentication for requesting data users where the user’s iden-
tity remains protected against the cloud service provider. In
addition, as the attribute based signature scheme is used to au-
thenticate requesting users, the cloud provider is able to control
the bandwidth consumption, thus, maintaining the system’s
availability. Obviously, the authentication of requesting users
permits to mitigate flooding attacks [9] as only authenticated
users can download encrypted data contents.
Second, as a decentralised multi-authority attribute based
framework, Ins-PAbAC ensures that users’ attributes are issued
and managed by multiple authorities. Therefore, it reduces
the bottleneck of considering one single central authority
for managing secret parameters of all the system’s users. In
addition, unlike other multi-authority attribute based schemes
which only support the issuance of one attribute per authority,
Ins-PAbAC enables issuing a set of attributes from every
attribute authority.
Third, thanks to the use of common public parameters and
one single access policy for both encryption and signature
algorithms, Ins-PAbAC is considered as highly scalable, pro-
viding an effective key management and offering interesting
performances such as low storage and computation costs, at
both the client and the cloud provider side.
Our Ins-PAbAC solution presented in this paper is an ex-
tension of the work that we published in [10]. As explained
below, this extension details formal threat models and security
analysis, emphasizes the support of multi-authority cloud stor-
age systems and introduces a proof-of-concept of the proposed
framework. The contributions of this work are as follows:
1) we extend the attribute-based signature scheme by
adding an accountability feature. In fact, the account-
ability consists in allowing an inspection authority to
reveal the identity of the signing user if needed. This
added feature is suitable in real-life scenarios, where
accountability and resources’ misuse prevention are re-
quired.
2) the use of a multi-authority framework leads us to pro-
vide a mechanism for tying the user’s key components
together to prevent collusion attacks between users.
As each key component may come from an attribute
authority while there is no coordination between the
different attribute authorities. Although its benefits in
reducing key-escrow attacks, the use of multiple not-
coordinated attribute authorities raises collusion attacks
between users where they can combine their attributes to
access outsourced data. To overcome these attacks, we
extended the proposed scheme by applying Lewko et
al.’s [11] technique for tying the user’s key components
together and preventing collusion attacks by applying a
user identifier Id.
3) we provide formal system and security models for Ins-
PAbAC framework. We discuss the resistance of Ins-
PAbAC against two adversaries, relying on two different
threat models. We prove that our proposed scheme sat-
isfies the confidentiality, the unforgeability, the privacy
and the anonymity removal requirements.
4) we evaluate the computational performances of our pro-
posal, based on the OpenStack Storage system (Swift)
testbed [12]. We conduct a number of experiments to
measure the processing and communication costs as well
as the impact of cryptographic algorithms’ execution at
both the user and cloud sides.
Paper Organisation – Section II presents security consid-
erations and design goals. Then, Section III reviews related
work and introduces both attribute based encryption and
signature mechanisms. In Section IV, we describe Ins-PAbAC
architecture, its system model as well as the related security
models. Afterwards, we detail the Ins-PAbAC framework de-
sign and describe its different procedures in Section V. In
Section VI, rigorous security discussions are given. Then,
theoretical performance analysis is provided in Section VII.
Finally, implementation results are introduced in Section VIII,
before concluding in Section IX.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Nowadays, cloud services are becoming the main archi-
tectural model for health organisations, thanks to the various
advantages they provide to all the involved actors [13], [14].
For instance, cloud applications guarantee accessibility to an
expanded range of access devices such as PCs, network of
computers, smart-phones and network-enabled medical de-
vices. Consequently, collaboration is made easier between
health-care staff in order to provide accurate health-care
services and avoid unnecessary redundant tasks. However,
these distributed applications and decentralised environments
raise data security and users’ privacy preservation challenges,
mainly with the myriad of laws and regulations aiming at
protecting users’ privacy and sensitive personal data, such as
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
[15] or the European General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) [16]. For instance, HIPAA states that access policies
have to be finely defined, such that authorized users may
belong to several groups with different access privileges to
outsourced data contents.
Let us consider a medical organisation that relies on cloud
based services to collect and share Electronic Health Records
(EHRs) among the medical staff, belonging to different or-
ganisations such as hospitals, research laboratories as well
as health ministry. A health-care information system based
on cloud services has to protect medical records from unau-
thorized access. For example, doctors need to share patients’
health information and collaborate with the involved hospital
employees to properly prescript treatments. As such, they
usually form dynamic sharing groups with different granted
privileges.
In addition, the system should protect the privacy of the
users. Hence, the private identifying information of the in-
volved cloud users, such as doctors and patients, must not be
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revealed to the cloud provider. For instance, the disclosure of
access patterns may reveal privacy-sensitive information about
patients and/or doctors and consequently may leak confidential
information about the medical data content.
Furthermore, although ensuring anonymous access to med-
ical data, designated authorities need to be able to reveal the
identity of a user when required. For instance, if a unauthorised
access or even modification of a medical record occurs, the
user should be identified.
Thus, our proposed Ins-PAbAC framework has to fulfill the
following properties:
• data confidentiality – Ins-PAbAC should ensure the se-
crecy of outsourced data contents against both curious
cloud service providers and malicious users.
• fine-grained access control – Ins-PAbAC should ensure
flexible security policies among several dynamic groups
of users with different access rights, belonging to diverse
groups.
• privacy – while requesting access to outsourced data
contents, the proposed Ins-PAbAC framework has to pro-
tect users’ access patterns. The cloud service provider
must be able to grant access without knowing additional
identifying information about the requesting users.
• accountability – preserving user’s privacy should not lead
to resources’ misuse. This implies, for security purposes,
that a designated authority should be able to recover the
identity of the requesting entity.
• low processing cost – the design of Ins-PAbAC algorithms
has to consider scalability features and devices’ process-
ing capabilities.
III. ATTRIBUTE BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY
Several security solutions have been proposed in the liter-
ature to provide secure data sharing in cloud [1], [17], [18].
Indeed, cryptographic mechanisms have been usually applied
to achieve fine grained access control for remote storage
systems [19], [20], [21].
More specifically, encryption is applied at the client side
in order to prevent unauthorized data disclosure to untrusted
servers and unauthorized users. Hence, the decryption keys
are only disclosed to the authorized users [1]. However,
these techniques ensure confidentiality of outsourced data, key
distribution remains complex, especially, while increasing the
number of users. Indeed, relying on cloud environments, data
owner may share data with users all over the world which
makes distribution of the decryption keys very difficult and
requires efficient and secure mechanisms.
Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) which was first intro-
duced by Sahai and Waters [22] in 2005, provides an encrypted
access control mechanisms over data. ABE relies on using
attributes to define decryption keys which reduces the key
management efforts.
In the following, we introduce Attribute Based Encryption
mechanisms (ABE) and their applications in cloud environ-
ments in Section III-A. Then, we present Attribute Based
Signature schemes (ABS) and we review ABS schemes use
in cloud applications in Section III-B.
A. Attribute based Encryption (ABE)
The concept of Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) has been
designed by Sahai and Waters in 2005, as a new technique
to ensure encrypted access control to data [22]. ABE is
differentiated from traditional encryption techniques as data
are encrypted w.r.t. to an access policy over a set of attributes.
A user is able to decrypt data if there is a match between his
secret key, which is generated from his authenticated set of
attributes, and the access policy associated with the ciphertext.
ABE mechanisms are categorised into two types, referred
to as Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) [23] and Ciphertext-Policy
ABE (CP-ABE) [8].
ABE schemes have been widely applied to secure out-
sourced data to distant cloud servers [24]. Although the pro-
posed schemes achieves encrypted fine grained access control
to data, they rely on a single authority to manage all the
attributes used in the system and issue the related secret keys
[25], [26], [27]. As such, the risk of key escrow attacks is
arising, considering that all users’ private keys are maintained
by one single central entity.
Lewko and Waters [11] have proposed a decentralized
attribute based encryption scheme, where users’ secret keys
are issued from different attribute authorities. Each attribute
authority is in charge of deriving a private key associated to
a user’s attribute. This proposal do not require the use of
a central trusted authority to issue secret keys which must
remain active and uncorrupted throughout the lifetime of the
system. Moreover, in order to prevent collusion in such a
setting, this scheme requires that each user has a unique global
identifier (GID). This identifier (GID) must be presented to
each attribute authority to receive the attribute’s secret key.
However, in their proposal, Lewko and Waters [11] assume
that each attribute authority is responsible for issuing only
one attribute.
Huang et al. [28] introduced a hierarchical attribute-based
encryption (HABE). In their proposal, a partial decryption
and signing construction was introduced thanks to the ap-
plication of a delegation mechanism consisting of delegating
most of the computation overhead on the client side to the
cloud service provider. Zhao et al. have proposed an attribute
encryption scheme with non-monotonic access-structures [29].
This proposed scheme is designed to achieve fine grained
access control in mobile health systems. However, [29] relies
on a central trusted authority to manage the attributes and
issue users’ secret keys. Based on the decentralized attribute
based encryption scheme proposed by Lewko et al. [11], Zhou
et al. presented a multi-authority-attribute based encryption
scheme for cloud data storage systems [30]. This scheme
guarantees users’ revocation relying on the attribute authority
to re-issue secret keys to remaining non-revoked users. Wei
et al. [31] have designed a decentralized cloud data sharing
solution based on a multi-authority attribute based encryption
scheme. Yang et al. [32] have proposed a similar data sharing
solution for cloud computing which is based on multi-authority
attribute based encryption. Recently, Sandor et al. [33] have
proposed a multi-authority ABE scheme to secure data in
mobile cloud data storage systems.
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Finally, it is worth noticing that the reviewed techniques do
not propose a mechanism to authenticate the requesting users.
Moreover, most of the decentralized attribute based encryption
schemes rely on the use of Lewko et al. decentralized ABE
scheme [11] which assumes that each attribute authority is
responsible for issuing only one attribute.
B. Attribute based Signature (ABS)
Attribute-Based Signature (ABS) has been derived from
ABE mechanism to provide a fine grained and privacy pre-
serving authentication of users. Similar to the concept of ABE,
ABS consists in enabling a signer to sign a message only
if his set of attributes satisfies a defined access policy. A
verification entity can verify the signature’s correctness with-
out accessing the signer’s identity neither knowing the exact
attributes used to generate the signature [38]. In 2011, Maji et
al. [38] introduced the first construction for a multi-authority
attribute based signature scheme. This scheme consists of
using multiple attribute authorities to manage attributes and
issue related secret keys.
Several works rely on the attribute based signature to ensure
data owners’ authentication and fine grained access control
over outsourced data to the cloud. Indeed, Zhao et al. [37]
applied the ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption (CP-
ABE) proposed by Bethencourt et al. [8] combined with the
Maji et al. [38] attribute based signature to ensure fine grained
access control to outsourced data in the cloud. This proposal is
based on a centralized ABE and ABS schemes, thus it relies
on a central trusted authority to issue secret keys to all the
users.
Liu et al. [49] proposed a secure attribute based signa-
ture scheme where most computations required for signature
generation procedure are outsourced to the CSP side. In this
protocol, CSP is able to generate a half-signature using an
outsourcing key received from the user. After receiving the
half-signature, the user is able to transform it into a valid
ABS signature. Rao et al. [54] have proposed a Key-Policy
Attribute Based Signature (KP-ABS) scheme with a constant
signature size. In their scheme, the signing key is associated
with an access structure while the signature is generated
using an attribute set satisfying the access structure. However,
ciphertext-policy attribute based signature schemes (CP-ABS)
are more appropriate to data sharing than KP-ABS since
it enables the encrypting entity to generate an access tree
over selected attributes. Ibrahim et al. [52] have proposed an
attribute based authentication scheme. This scheme enables a
cloud user to anonymously authenticate with the cloud server.
Most of aforementioned attribute based signature schemes
have been proposed as an anonymous authentication mech-
anism in cloud sharing scenarios. Although anonymity is
an important feature of attribute based signature mechanism,
some malicious users may take advantage of this feature to
escape from being traced. Hence, it is interesting to introduce
the accountability feature in order to trace the signer’s identity
by an inspection authority when necessary.
Accountability in attribute based signatures was first intro-
duced by Khader [34]. However, the proposed feature consists
of revealing the attributes used to sign while only preserving
the anonymity of the signer’s identity.
El Kaafarani et al. [46] have proposed the first fully
traceable decentralised attribute based signature. Subsequently,
several traceable ABS schemes [55], [50] were proposed. In
[55], Kaaniche and Laurent have proposed an anonymous
certification (AC) mechanism built over a traceable attribute
based signature (ABS). Their proposal provides a data mini-
mization cryptographic scheme, permitting the user to reveal
only required information to any service provider and ensures
unlinkability between the different authentication sessions,
while preserving the anonymity of the requesting user. Hong et
al. [50] have introduced a key-policy attribute based signature
(KP-ABS) scheme. This scheme deals with the assumption of
including an untrusted authority. In this scheme, the signer’s
private key is composed of two parts: the first component is
generated by attribute authority while the second part is chosen
privately by the signer’s. Moreover, this proposal introduces
the accountability property. Recently, Cui et al. [53] applied
ABS to secure communication in vehicular ad-hoc networks.
This scheme ensures anonymous authentication in vehicular
networks while supporting the accountability feature.
Table I summarizes the main differences between our pro-
posed scheme Ins-PAbAC and the state of the art works. We
compare several works based on different features such as
multi-authority setting, accountability, security models, etc.
IV. MODEL DESCRIPTION
In this section, we first present our system architecture
in Section IV-A and the system model in Section IV-B.
Afterwards, we detail our security model in Section IV-C.
A. General Architecture
As depicted in Figure 1, our traceable Ins-PAbAC frame-
work considers a cloud storage system that involves multiple
authorities. The system model consists of the following five
different entities:
• The Central Trusted Authority (CTA) is responsible for
generating the global public parameters and the inspection
authority’s secret key. CTA is considered as a trusted
entity in our model.
• The Attribute Authorities (AA) are a group of authorities
responsible for managing attributes and issuing related
secret keys. Unlike state of the art multi-authorities ABE
schemes where each authority issues only one attribute,
in Ins-PAbAC, each AA may manage a whole set of
attributes. These authorities are considered as a trusted
entities as they have access to users secret keys as well
as their identities.
• The Inspection Authority (IA) is an independent authority
able to revoke the anonymity of a malicious user when
an attack occurs. IA is considered as a trusted entity.
• The Cloud Service Provider (CSP) is a remote cloud
server who stores and shares data among authorised users.
CSP is also responsible for authenticating users before
downloading data. CSP is a honest but curious entity,
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TABLE I: Features and Functionality Comparison of Attribute Based Encryption and Signature Schemes
Scheme Type Access policy Mutli-authority Accountability End User Authentication Security Models
Sahai et al. (2005) [22] Fuzzy Threshold 7 7 7 IND-CPA
Bethencourt et al. (2007) [8] CP-ABE Monotone 7 7 7 IND-CPA
Khader et al. (2007) [34] KP-ABS Monotone 7 7 X UF-CMA
Maji et al. (2008) [35] CP-ABS Monotone 7 7 7 UF-CMA
Li et al. (2010) [36] CP-ABS Threshold X 7 X IND-CPA
Zhao et al. (2011) [37] CP-ABE + CP-ABS Monotone 7 7 7 IND-CPA + UF-CMA
Maji et al. (2011) [38] CP-ABS Monotone X 7 X UF-CMA
Wang et al. (2010) [39] CP-ABE Monotone Herarchical 7 7 CPA-Security
Yu et al. (2010) [40] KP-ABE Monotone X X X CPA-Security
Waters (2011) [41] CP-ABE Monotone 7 7 7 CPA-Security
Lewko et al. (2011) [11] CP-ABE Monotone X 7 7 CPA-Security
Ruj et al. (2011) [42] CP-ABE Monotone X 7 7 CPA-Security
Ruj et al. (2012) [43] CP-ABE + CP-ABS Monotone X 7 7 IND-CPA + UF-CMA
Li et al. (2013) [44] KP-ABE Monotone X 7 7 IND-CPA
Yang et al. (2014) [45] CP-ABE Monotone X 7 7 IND-CPA
El Kaafarani et al. (2014) [46] CP-ABS Monotone X X X UF-CMA
Ruj et al. (2014) [47] CP-ABS Monotone X 7 7 IND-CPA + UF-CMA
Horvath et al.(2015) [48] CP-ABE Monotone X 7 7 IND-CPA
Liu et al. (2015) [49] CP-ABS Monotone 7 7 7 UF-CMA
Rao et al. (2016) [49] KP-ABS Monotone 7 7 7 UF-CMA
Kaaniche et al. (2016) CP-ABS Monotone 7 7 X UF-CMA
Hong et al. (2016) [50] KP-ABS Monotone 7 7 X UF-CMA
Belguith et al. [10] (2016) CP-ABE + CP-ABS Monotone X 7 X IND-CPA + UF-CMA
Huang et al. (2017) [28] CP-ABE + CP-ABS Monotone 7 7 X IND-CPA + UF-CMA
Belguith et al. (2018) [51] CP-ABE Monotone X 7 7 IND-CPA
Wei et al. (2018) [31] CP-ABE Monotone X 7 7 IND-CPA
Yang et al. (2018) [32] CP-ABE Monotone X 7 7 IND-CPA
Ibrahim et al. (2018) [52] CP-ABS Monotone 7 7 7 UF-CMA
Sandor et al. (2019) [33] CP-ABE Monotone X 7 7 IND-CPA
Cui et al. (2019) [53] CP-ABS Threshold 7 X X UF-CMA
Ins-PAbAC CP-ABE + CP-ABS Monotone X X X IND-CPA + UF-CMA
it executes the protocol properly but it tries to gain
knowledge about data and their users.
• The data owner (O) is the data producer. He defines
access rights and encrypts data with respect to them
before outsourcing to the cloud.
• The data user (U) requests access to data and authenti-
cates with the CSP. He decrypts the received data using
his access rights. A user may be malicious if she tries to
access data without authorisation.
B. System Model
Our Ins-PAbAC proposal is defined upon the following
nine algorithms. It involves four procedures on the basis of
three phases. During the first phase, the system initialisation
procedure SYS INIT is executed. The second phase occurs
when the data owner wants to share data files with other
cloud users, based on both the data storage procedure STORE
and the data retrieval procedure BACKUP. While the first and
second phases are mandatory for outsourcing data files to the
cloud servers, the third phase occurs when there is a need for
user’s anonymity revocation, relying on the execution of the
inspection procedure INSPEC.
The SYS INIT procedure consists of three randomized
algorithms for the generation of public parameters referred
to as setup, the generation of the private and public param-
eters related to the involved attribute authorities denoted by
setupauth, and the keygen algorithm to generate the users’
private keys. The STORE procedure consists of the encdata
algorithm used to encrypt data files in order to perform the data
storage scenario. For data retrieval, the BACKUP procedure
deals with the user’ authentication, namely sign and verif
algorithms and the data decryption algorithm referred to as
decdata. The inspection procedure occurs when there is a
need to reveal the identity of the user. It consists of trace
and judge algorithms.
• SYS INIT procedure
setup(λ)→ PP – the setup algorithm is performed by
the central trusted authority (CTA). This randomized
algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and
outputs the global public parameters PP and the the
inspection authority’s secret key skins.
setupauth(PP) – this randomized algorithm is executed
by an attribute authority AA j. It takes as inputs the
public parameters PP and outputs the pair of the attribute
authority’s private and public keys (skAA j , pkAA j).
keygen(PP,skAA j , pkAA j , Id,S j)→ skS j – this algorithm
is performed by an attribute authority AA j in order
to generate the user’s secret key related to a set of
attributes S j = {a1 j , · · · ,an j}, where n j is the number of
attributes of S j. It takes as input the global parameters
PP, the pair of private and public attribute authority’s
keys (skAA j , pkAA j) and the users’ identity Id. It outputs
the secret key skS j related to the set of attributes S j.
• STORE procedure
encdata(PP,{pkAA j},DF ,(A,ρ))→ ED – the encdata
algorithm is performed by the data owner O. It takes
as input the global public parameters PP, the set of
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Fig. 1: Ins-PAbAC Network Model: Main Entities, Phases and Procedures
involved attribute authorities’ public keys {pkAA j}, the
data file DF and the access policy (A,ρ). The encryption
algorithm outputs a ciphertext denoted by ED.
• BACKUP procedure
sign(PP,m,(A,ρ),skS j)→ Σ – this algorithm is run by
the requesting user U. Given the public parameters PP, a
random token m, the encryption access policy (A,ρ) and
the user’s secret key skS j related to the set of attributes
S j that satisfies the access policy, the signing algorithm
outputs a signature Σ.
verif(PP,{pkAA j},m,Σ,(A,ρ))→V – this deterministic
algorithm fulfilled by the cloud provider CSP takes
as input the global public parameters PP, a set of the
involved attribute authorities’ public keys {pkAA j}, a
random token m, a signature Σ and the encryption access
policy (A,ρ). It outputs a boolean value V , such that
V = true if Σ is valid and V = false otherwise.
decdata(PP,{skS j},(A,ρ),ED) → DF – the user U
executes the decryption algorithm to retrieve the original
data file DF . This algorithm takes as input the public
parameters PP, the user secret decryption key {skS j}, the
encryption access policy (A,ρ) and the ciphertext ED
and outputs the original data file DF .
• INSPEC procedure
trace(PP,sins,{pkAA j},σ,(A,ρ)) → (sid,π) – this
deterministic algorithm is performed by an inspection
authority. It takes as input the global public parameters
PP, a set of the involved attribute authorities’ public keys
{pkAA j}, the inspection authority’s secret key skins, a
signature Σ and an access policy (A,ρ), and outputs the
identity of the signer sid and a proof π attesting to this
claim. If the algorithm is unable to trace the signature
to a signer, it returns an error message.Note that sid
is an identity of the user generated over the attributes
authorities public keys and his global identity Id. This
value is stored in a matching table at the inspection
authority side to retrieve a malicious user’s identity
while executing the inspection procedure.
judge(PP,{pkAA j},Σ,(A,ρ),sid,π)→ (0,1)– the judge
is a deterministic algorithm which takes as input a the
global public parameters PP, a set of the involved attribute
authorities’ public keys {pkAA j}, a signature Σ, an access
policy (A,ρ), a signer identity sid, and a tracing proof π
, and outputs 1 if π is a valid proof that sid has produced
σ or 0 otherwise.
Our traceable Ins-PAbAC scheme has to satisfy the correct-
ness property. The correctness property requires that for all
security parameter λ, all public parameters PP ∈ setup(λ),
all (skAA j , pkAA j) ∈ setupauth(PP), all secret keys skS j ∈
keygen(PP,{skAA j}, Id,S j), all (A,ρ) ∈ G where G is the
access structure space, If the user has a set of attributes S j
satisfying the access policy (A,ρ), for all generated signa-
ture Σ ∈ sign(PP,m,(A,ρ),skS j), the verification algorithm
verif(PP,{pkAA j},m,Σ,(A,ρ)) outputs 1.
In addition, for all ED ∈ encdata(PP,{pkAA j},DF ,(A,ρ)),
if the user has successfully obtained the secret key skS j related
to the required attributes for deciphering the encrypted file and
has successfully signed the received message m from the CSP,
the decdata(PP,skS j ,(A,ρ),ED) outputs DF . Indeed, for all
(sid,π) ∈ trace(PP,sins,{pkAA j},σ,(A,ρ)),
judge(PP,{pkAA j},Σ,(A,ρ),sid,π) outputs 1.
C. Security Model
In this section, we consider two adversaries for proving the
security and privacy properties of our Ins-PAbAC scheme. First,
we point out the case of a honest but curious cloud provider.
In fact, the cloud server is considered as honest as it provides
accurate inputs or outputs, while properly executing any calcu-
lations expected from it. However, it is curious as it attempts
to gain extra knowledge from the protocol. Consequently, we
consider the honest but curious adversary against both the
data confidentiality requirement considering adaptive chosen
plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) and the computational privacy
requirements.
Second, we consider the case of malicious users trying to
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override their rights. That is, malicious users may attempt
to deviate from the protocol or to provide invalid inputs.
As such, we consider the malicious adversary mainly against
the unforgeability requirement considering adaptive chosen
messages attacks (UF-CMA).
Third, we consider the case of a malicious user trying to
forge a signature that is recognised by the tracing authority. In
other words, this malicious user tries to produce a signature
while the inspection authority traces another signing user.
Therefore, we consider the adversary against the anonymity
removal requirement.
1) Indistinguishability: In our security model, we assume
that the adversary is allowed to query for any secret keys
that cannot be used for decrypting the challenge ciphertext.
Moreover, we consider the assumption introduced in Lewko
et al. proposal [11] where the adversary can only corrupt
authorities statically. As considered by all the multi authorities
ABE schemes such as Chase et al. [56] and Lewko et al. [11],
we consider the static corruption model as the model where
the adversary can only corrupt authorities statically before the
game starts and not after. For this purpose, we define Expind ,
a security game between an adversary A and a challenger
C . The adversary tries to decipher a signcrypted message,
i.e; to distinguish between two randomly generated encrypted
messages, without having sufficient deciphering attributes.
In their standard definition, multi-authority ABE schemes are
proved to be secure based on Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA)
security games [11], [56], [41]. Indeed, CPA is a security
game that captures the resistance of a public key encryption
scheme against adversaries. In CPA, the adversary has access
to a key generation oracle, however, this access is limited
until the challenge ciphertext is known. For some other ABE
schemes, a stronger security game can be considered which
is Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA). In CCA, the adversary
has, in addition, access to a decryption oracle, however, this
access is also limited until the challenge ciphertext is known.
This requirement derives the non-malleability feature which
consists that the adversary cannot output a second ciphertext
so that the corresponding plaintexts are meaningfully related.
As for Ins-PAbAC, we consider the CPA-security game as
the scheme is based on Lewko et al. which is proved to be
CPA-secure in the standard model. Further details about these
security notions can be found in [57].
Let consider SAA the set of all attribute authorities and S
′
AA
a set of corrupted attributes authorities.
Our Ins-PAbAC scheme is secure against static corruption of
the attribute authorities if there is no probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) adversary that can win the Expind security game
defined below with a non-negligible advantage.
The Expind security game is formally defined, between an
adversary A and a challenger C , as follows:
Initialisation – in this phase, the adversary A chooses a
challenge access structure Ψ∗ = (A∗,ρ∗) and sends it to the
challenger C .
Setup – in this phase, the challenger C runs the setup
algorithm to generate the public parameters.
Then, the adversary A selects a set of corrupted attributes
authorities S′AA ⊂ SAA and runs the setupauth algorithm to
obtain their public and private keys.
Then, C queries the honest attribute authorities’ public and
private keys by running the setupauth algorithm. Afterwards,
the challenger C publishes the public keys of the honest
attributes authorities.
Queries phase – in this phase, for each session k, the
adversary queries the secret keys related to a set of attributes
{S j}k belonging to a set of non-corrupted attributes authorities
ai ∈ SAA \S
′
AA. Then, the challenger returns the corresponding
secret keys to the adversary. Note that the set of attributes
{S j}k does not satisfy the access policy Ψ
∗ = (A∗,ρ∗) i.e;
Ψ∗({S j}k) 6= 1.
Challenge – during the challenge phase, the adversary
chooses two equal length plaintexts M0 and M1 and sends
them to the challenger. The challenger C chooses a random
bit b such that b ∈ {0,1} and encrypts Mb under the access
structure (A∗,ρ∗). The generated ciphertext Eb is then returned
to the adversary.
Queries phase 2 – in this phase, the adversary A who
has already received Mb, can query a polynomially bounded
number of queries as in Queries Phase 1, except that the
adversary A can not query secret keys related to a set of
attributes which satisfy the access policy Ψ∗ = (A∗,ρ∗).
Guess – the adversary tries to guess which message Mb′
where b′ ∈ {0,1} corresponds to the challenge ciphertext Eb.
The advantage of the adversary to win the game is defined as:
AdvA [Exp
Con f (1ξ)] = |Pr[b = b′]−
1
2
|
Definition 1. Ins-PAbAC is CPA-secure (i.e., chosen plaintext
attack (CPA) secure ) against static corruption of the attribute
authorities if the advantage AdvA [Exp
Con f (1ξ)] is negligible
for all PPT adversaries.
2) Unforgeability: As considered by all the multi authori-
ties ABS schemes such as Maji et al. [38] and El Kharafani et
al. [46], we consider the static corruption model as the model
where the adversary can only corrupt authorities statically
before the game starts and not after. Let consider SAA the set
of all attribute authorities and S′AA a set of corrupted attributes
authorities.
Our Ins-PAbAC scheme is unforgeable against chosen mes-
sage attack (UF-CMA) if there is no probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) adversary that can win the Expun f security game
with non-negligible advantage. The Expun f security game is
formally defined, between an adversary A and a challenger C
as follows:
Initialisation – in this phase, the adversary A chooses
a challenge access structure (A∗,ρ∗) and sends it to the
challenger C .
Setup – the challenger C chooses a security parameter λ and
generates the public parameters by running the setup algo-
rithm. Then, C sends the public parameters to the adversary A .
Moreover, the challenger runs the setupauth for non corrupted
authorities and publishes the related public keys. Then, the
adversary A selects a set of corrupted attributes authorities
S′AA ⊂ SAA and runs the setupauth algorithm to obtain their
public and private keys.
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Queries phase – in this phase, for each session k, the
adversary A can query secret keys related to the set of
attributes {S j}k belonging to a set of non-corrupted authorities
S′AA \ SAA. The challenger C returns the corresponding secret
keys to the adversary A .
Moreover, the adversary A can query the signature for any
message m and for any access structure (A,ρ).
Note that the adversary A can not query secret keys related
to a set of attributes which satisfy the challenge access
structure (A∗,ρ∗).
Forgery phase – the adversary generates a signature Σ∗
on a message m∗ selected by the challenger, with respect to
the challenge access structure (A∗,ρ∗). The adversary wins
the Expun f game if Σ∗ is a valid signature on the access
structure (A∗,ρ∗) where this latter was not queried before and
the combination of the adversary’s attributes with the attributes
related to the corrupted attribute authorities does not satisfy
the access structure.
Hence, the adversary’s advantage is defined as follows:
AdvA [Exp
un f (1ξ)] = |Pr[Expun f (1ξ)] = 1|
Definition 2. Ins-PAbAC scheme is unforgeable against
chosen-message attack (UF-CMA), if the advantage
AdvA [Exp
un f (1ξ)] is negligible for all PPT adversaries.
This unforgeability property also includes the collusion
among users trying to override their rights by combining their
complementary attributes to generate a signature satisfying a
given access structure. It also covers the non frameability case
when a user also aims to override his rights but on his own.
3) Privacy: Ins-PAbAC is a privacy preserving mechanism
if it relies on the computational private signature scheme.
Indeed, a signature scheme is said computational private if
there is no adversary that can pinpoint which set of attributes
is used for the signature generation while given an unbounded
computational power.
We require that all the attribute authorities are honest as
knowing the H (Id) of a user. In this game, we are interested to
prove that our scheme is private against an honest but curious
CSP.
Our Ins-PAbAC scheme is said to be computationally private
if any adversary A running in polynomial time cannot win the
ExpA
Priv security game with non-negligible advantage.
The ExpA
Priv security game is formally defined, between
an adversary A and a challenger C as follows:
Setup – the adversary A requests from the challenger C
the global public parameters as well as the public authorities’
keys. Then, the challenger C runs the setup algorithm and
the setupauth algorithms. Afterwards, C returns the global
public parameters PP and the set of the public authorities’
keys {pkAA j} to the adversary A .
Challenge phase – the adversary A chooses an access
structure ψ = (A,ρ), two sets of attributes S j1 and S j2 sat-
isfying the monotone access structure ψ = (A,ρ) such that
ψ(S j1) = ψ(S j2) = 1 and a message m and sends them to the
challenger C .
Afterwards, the challenger C picks a random bit b ∈
{1,2} and executes the KeyGen algorithm such that skS jb =
Keygen(PP,{skAA j}, IdC ,S jb) and outputs the signature Σb =
sign(PP,m,(A,ρ),skS jb). The signature Σb is sent to the
adversary A as a challenge signature.
Guess – the adversary A tries to guess which set of
attributes S j1 or S j2 was used to generate the signature Σb.
A outputs a bit b′ and wins the game if b′ = b.
The advantage of the adversary A in the above game is
defined as follows:
AdvA [Exp
Priv(1ξ)] = |Pr[b = b′]−
1
2
|
Definition 3. Our accountable Ins-PAbAC satisfies the com-
putational privacy property if for any two attribute sets S j1
and S j2, any message m, any signature Σ with respect to any
access structure ψ = (A,ρ) where ψ(S j1) = ψ(S j2) = 1, any
adversary A cannot distinguish which attribute set S j1 or S j2
is used to generate the signature Σ, i.e; AdvA [Exp
Priv(1ξ)] is
negligible with respect to the security parameter λ.
4) Anonymity Removal: The anonymity removal require-
ment ensures that there is no adversary that can produce a
signature while the inspection authority traces another signing
user. In addition, it also requires that there is no adversary that
can generate a non-traceable signature which has been suc-
cessfully verified by the service provider. Thus, the anonymity
removal requirement covers the untraceable forgery attacks.
In the anonymity removal game, the adversary is allowed
to corrupt the tracing authority and ask for the signing keys of
any signer to be revealed. However, unlike the full unforge-
ability game presented in Section VI-C, we require that all
the attribute authorities are honest as knowing the secret key
of any attribute authority makes it easy to create untraceable
signatures by malicious users.
Our Ins-PAbAC scheme is secure under anonymity removal
attack if there is no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
adversary that can win the ExpAnR security game with a non-
negligible advantage.
The ExpAnR security game is formally defined, between an
adversary A and a challenger C as follows:
Initialisation – in this phase, the adversary A chooses
a challenge access structure (A∗,ρ∗) and sends it to the
challenger C .
Setup – the challenger chooses a security parameter λ
and generates the public parameters by running the setup
algorithm. The challenger sends the public parameters to the
adversary. Moreover, the challenger runs the setupauth for non
corrupted authorities and publishes the related public keys.
Queries phase – in this phase, for each session k, the ad-
versary A can query secret keys related to the set of attributes
{S j}k belonging to non-corrupted authorities. The challenger
C returns the corresponding secret keys to the adversary.
Moreover, A can query the signature for any message m and
for any access structure (A,ρ).
Output – the adversary generates a signature Σ∗ on a
message m∗ selected by the challenger, with respect to the
challenge access structure (A∗,ρ∗). The adversary wins the
ExpAnR game if Σ∗ is untraceable by the challenger C , relying
on the trace algorithm.
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The advantage of the adversary A in the above game is
defined as:
AdvA [Exp
AnR(1ξ)] = |Pr[ExpAnR(1ξ)] = 1|
Definition 4. Ins-PAbAC scheme is secure against anonymity
removal attacks, if the advantage AdvA [Exp
AnR(1ξ)] is negli-
gible for all PPT adversaries.
V. INS-PABAC: AN ACCOUNTABLE PRIVACY PRESERVING
ATTRIBUTE BASED FRAMEWORK FOR FINE GRAINED
ACCESS CONTROL IN CLOUDS
A. Motivation
In order to achieve fine grained and privacy preserving
access control to outsourced data in cloud storage, we combine
two cryptographic techniques, ciphertext-policy attribute based
encryption (CP-ABE) and attribute based signature (ABS).
Moreover, ABS ensures the accountability feature which is
necessary for imputing malicious acts to individuals. Attribute
based encryption is appropriate for cloud data sharing thanks
to its functional properties. First, attribute based techniques do
not require certificates to certify the users’ public keys as in the
traditional public key cryptography, thus leading to an easier
key management system. Second, the public keys are derived
with no need for previous computation of corresponding
private keys. For instance, in attribute based cryptography,
there are no requirements to generate the private key before
the public key unlike traditional public key derivation schemes.
Third, CP-ABE encryption enables the enciphering entity to
only exploit public parameters and generate the access struc-
ture to encrypt data before outsourcing the data files to cloud
servers. Hence, this technique is much more appropriate for
data outsourcing and for one-to-many communications than
other traditional encryption techniques. Fourth, the enciphering
entity does not know the entities who are able to access data,
thus providing strong privacy feature. Fifth, CP-ABE specifies
fine-grained access rights for each individual user through
the assignment of a set of attributes. Only users who hold
attributes satisfying the access tree of the encrypted data can
decrypt them. Thereofore, CP-ABE is considered as one of
the most appropriate public key primitive for one-to-many
communications, supporting efficient key management, access
control and encryption.
Furthermore, Attribute Based Signature (ABS) is of interest
for supporting shared access control, as presented in our Ins-
PAbAC framework. In ABS, messages are signed w.r.t. an
access structure, and the CSP has to verify that the requesting
user has a set of attributes that satisfies the access structure.
As such, additionally to being certificate-less, having separate
generation of public and private keys, and managing access
rights based on attributes assignment, likely to CP-ABE, ABS
authenticates the user without knowing his identity or the set
of attributes used in the signing procedure.
In our accountable Ins-PAbAC framework, we design an
extension of the centralized attribute based encryption scheme
introduced by Waters [41] to achieve a multi-authority attribute
based encryption scheme based on an adaptation of Lewko et
al. multi-authority ABE technique. In addition, we design a
multi-authority attribute based signature scheme based on an
original use of Waters’ identity based scheme [58]. Indeed,
instead of defining a user by his identity, we change the
scheme to define a user using a set of attributes. We ensure,
by this design, an enhanced privacy preservation of the user’s
identifying information. Furthermore, we extend the designed
scheme to a multi-authority setting. For instance, the attributes
used in the signature are issued by different authorities to avoid
key escrow attacks led against a central authority. Unlike
other multi-authority attribute based techniques [47], [11], the
proposed encryption and signature schemes presented by Ins-
PAbAC support the issuance of a set of attributes obtained
from the same authority. This feature enables saving the
communication and computation costs of the proposed access
control scheme.
Furthermore, the data owner defines only one access policy
to be used in both the encryption and authentication phases.
To authenticate data users when requesting access to an
outsourced data file, CSP first asks the user to sign a random
message w.r.t. the access policy associated to the requested
ciphertext and uploaded by the data owner. This feature allows
the CSP to restrict the ciphertext’s retrieval to only users who
are able to decrypt it. In other words, if a user was able to sign
the message w.r.t. the encryption access policy, then he proved
that he holds the set of attributes satisfying the encryption
access policy and he will be able to decrypt the ciphertext.
To remove anonymity of users which is required by the
CSP in case of malicious acts, we design a new accountability
mechanism, working as follows. After an attack is detected,
the CSP who has previously registered the user’s signed token
can forward to the inspection authority the user’s signature
along with the used access policy and requests for anonymity
removal. Then, the inspection authority can use the user’s
signature to retrieve sid and then reveal the user’s identity.
Therefore, the Ins-PAbAC signature scheme is extended to
support the accountability property, that is the capability for an
inspection authority to trace the identity of anonymous users.
For ease of presentation, the different notations used in this
paper are listed in Table II.
TABLE II: The different notations used in this paper
Notation Description
PP Public parameters
skAA j Private key of an attribute authority AA j
pkAA j Public key of an attribute authority AA j
SU Set of users’ attributes
S j Set of attributes certified by the attribute authority AA j
SkS j Secret keys related to the set of attributes S j obtained from the attribute authority AA j
AA Attribute Authority
DF Data file
O Data Owner
U User
ED Encrypted data file
m Authentication message to be signed by a user
Σ Signature over a message m
ψ Access policy
sins Secret key of the inspection authority
Id User’s identity used to tie his secret keys
Ω Number of attribute authorities
sid An identity of user managed by the inspection authority
n Number of attributes in the access policy
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B. Overview
In Ins-PAbAC, the data owner O first defines an access
structure ψ that points out who can access the outsourced
data with respect to a set of attributes. Then, the data file is
encrypted under the access structure ψ, based on an attribute
based encryption algorithm. Subsequently, the data owner
stores the encrypted data in the cloud. When a user U wants
to access the outsourced data file, he has first to authenticate
with the cloud. For this purpose, he has to sign a random
message, obtained from the cloud, under the access structure ψ
associated with the outsourced data file. Afterwards, the cloud
verifies the correctness of the received signature in order to
send the requested elements, namely the encrypted data file.
Furthermore, if a malicious user forwards a forged signature
to the cloud service provider, this latter can request that this
user is traced and his identity is revealed by an independent
trusted inspection authority. Based on the required attributes,
specified in the access structure ψ, the requesting user uses
his private keys in order to decrypt the encrypted data file.
Our Ins-PAbAC construction relies on the following com-
plexity assumptions:
Definition 5. Computational Diffie Hellman problem (CDH)
Given a generator g of a multiplicative cyclic group G of
order N and given two group elements ga ∈ G and gb ∈ G
where a,b ∈ ZN are two secrets, the problem of calculating
gab from ga and gb is called the Computational Diffie Hellman
problem.
Definition 6. Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assump-
tion (DBDH)
Given a generator g of a multiplicative cyclic group G of
order N and given three group elements ga ∈ G, gb ∈ G and
gc ∈ G where a,b,c ∈ Z∗N are three secrets, the problem of
distinguishing between tuples of the form (ga,gb,gc, ê(g,g)abc)
and (ga,gb,gc, ê(g,g)z) for some random integer z, is called
the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption (DBDH).
C. Construction
In this section, we review the procedures and algorithms of
our traceable Ins-PAbAC construction.
1) System Initialisation Procedure – SYS INIT: The
SYS INIT procedure consists of three randomized algorithms,
defined as follows:
• setup – the CTA defines two multiplicative groups G1
and GT of order N, a bilinear map ê : G1×G1→GT and
a collision resistant hash function H : {0,1}∗ → ZN . In
addition, it chooses two generators g,h of G1 such that
h = gsins where sins is the inspection authority’s private
key. Then, the CTA picks at random a set of random
values {ri}i∈[1,q], such that ri ∈ ZN , ui = g
ri and {u0 =
g, · · · ,uq} are generators of G1. Finally, it outputs the
global public parameters PP defined as follows:
PP= {G1,GT ,N,H ,h, ê,u0, · · · ,uq}
• setupauth – each attribute authority AA j generates
the pair of its private and public authority’s keys
(skAA j , pkAA j) defined as follows:
skAA j = (α j, t j)
pkAA j = (ê(g,g)
α j ,gt j) = ( ˆpkAA j ,
ˇpkAA j)
Where α j, t j ∈ ZN are random values.
• keygen – for any user U having a set of attributes S j =
{a1 j , · · · ,an j} where n j is the number of attributes of S j,
the attribute authority AA j chooses a random value fU j ∈
ZN . Then, it computes the secret key skS j as depicted by
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 keygen procedure
1: Input: the global parameters PP, the pair of private and
public attribute authority’s keys (skAA j , pkAA j), a set of
attributes S j and the users’ identity Id.
2: Output: the secret key skS j related to the set of attributes
S j
3: M j← g
α j ht j h fU j ht jH (Id);
4: skS j ←{M j};
5: L j← g
t j g fU j ;
6: skS j ← skS j ∪{L j};
7: for all i ∈ [1 . . .n j] do
8: Ki, j← ui
t j ui
fU j ;
9: skS j ← skS j ∪{Ki, j};
10: end for
11: return skS j
2) Data Storage Procedure – STORE: To outsource a data
file (DF ) to the cloud, the data owner O performs the STORE
procedure. For this purpose, he first defines an access policy ψ
and obviously selects the attribute needed to satisfy it. We note
that the access policy ψ is described in terms of a monotonic
boolean formula. We represent the boolean formula as an
access tree where the interior nodes are AND and OR gates,
and the leaf nodes correspond to attributes [10]. Thus, the
access policy corresponds to the couple (A,ρ) where A is an
n× l access matrix and ρ is the function that maps the matrix
rows to the required attributes. These attributes have to be
obtained from a set of certified Attribute authority (AA j) that
is responsible of issuing the required attributes. After defining
the access structure (A,ρ), the data owner encrypts the data file
DF , using the encdata algorithm. We note that our encryption
algorithm relies on Lewko and Waters ABE scheme [11]. That
is, we extend this proposal [11] to support a decentralised
setting for deriving a set of private keys related to a set of
attributes from each single attribute authority, while preserving
users’ privacy with respect to the involved attribute authorities.
The STORE procedure consists of the encdata algorithm,
defined as follows:
• encdata – the data owner O first picks two random
values p,s ∈ Z2N . Then, the encdata algorithm
computes λi and wi such that λi = ~Ai · ~v where
~v = [s,v1, · · · ,vl ] ∈ ZN
l is a random vector and wi = ~Ai ·~τ
such as ~τ = [0,τ1, · · · ,τl ] ∈ ZN
l is a random vector. The
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encdata algorithm outputs the ciphertext as a tuple
ED = (C0,C1,i,C2,i,C3,i)i∈[1,n], where i presents a matrix
row corresponding to an attribute i, defined as follows:



















C0 = DF ê · (g,g)
s
C1,i = ê(g,g)
λi
C2,i = g
pui
p
C3,i = g
pgwiui
p
3) Data Backup Procedure – BACKUP: For the data re-
trieval scenario, the BACKUP procedure starts with the user’
authentication, with respect to the sign and verif algorithms.
Once authenticated, the requesting user executes the data
decryption algorithm referred to as decdata, to retrieve the
data file DF .
a) Anonymous User Authentication: When a user U
wants to access to the encrypted data file (ED) outsourced
by the data owner O, the CSP has first to authenticate the user
U, with respect to the access structure (A,ρ) associated with
the encrypted data file. So that, the cloud provider sends a
random value m which consists of the cloud provider identity
concatenated with the current time (i.e. m is assumed to be
different for each authentication session). The requesting user
has then to sign the received value m with respect to the access
structure (A,ρ) and sends his signature to the cloud provider.
We note that if the verification fails, the user cannot access to
data and the cloud provider does not send the encrypted data
file. The anonymous authentication procedure consists of two
algorithms, defined as follows:
• sign – the user first selects the sub-set of his attributes
SU that satisfies the access policy, such as: ψ(SU ) = 1
and signs the received value m. The user finally sends
the signature Σ to the cloud provider who checks the
resulting signature. Thus, the user first converts ψ to
its corresponding monotone span program A which is
an n× l access matrix, with respect to the row labeling
function ρ : [n]→ SU . In addition, he computes the vector
~y such as ψ(SU ) = 1 and ~y ·~A = [1,0, · · · ,0]. In order to
sign the random token m, the data owner first chooses
two random values r, t ∈ ZN and computes the signature
Σ = (xi∈[1,n],z j∈[1,κ],σ1,σ2,σ3,σ4) as follows:







































σ1 = ∏
n
i=1 ∏
κ
j=1[(K{ρ(i), j}ui
t)]yihmtgmrht
σ2 = ∏
κ
j=1 M jh
t
σ3 = ∏
κ
j=1 L jg
t
σ4 = ê(g,g
rht)
xi = [∏
κ
j=1 L jg
t ]yi
z j = ê( ˇpkAA j ,h
H (id))ê(g,h)t
for all i ∈ [1,n] and j ∈ [1,κ] Where κ is the number of
involved attribute authorities.
Finally, the signature for the message m generated by the
user with respect to the signing policy (A,ρ) is set as
follows:
Σ = (xi∈[1,n],z j∈[1,κ],σ1,σ2,σ3,σ4) (1)
• verif – the access policy ψ is first converted to its corre-
sponding monotone span program A. Then, the CSP com-
putes the vector ~β = [1,β2, · · · ,βn], such that {βi}i∈[2,n]
are randomly chosen and computes µi = ∑ j=1
lβ jAi, j. The
cloud server accepts the signature if both Equation 2 and
Equation 3 hold.
First, the CSP verifies the following equation:
ê(g,σ1.σ2)
?
=
κ
∏
j=1
[ ˆpkAA j · z j ·σ
m
4 ]
n
∏
i=1
ê(hµiuρ(i),xi) (2)
Then, he computes the vector~y such as~y ·~A= [1,0, · · · ,0]
and verifies that the following equation holds for all i ∈
[1,n]:
xi
?
= σ
yi
3 (3)
The correctness of the signature verification algorithm is
detailed in Section VI-A.
b) Data Retrieval: The data retrieval procedure consists
of the decdata algorithm, defined as follows:
• decdata – for each matrix row i, the user computes:
r =
C1,i.ê(∏
κ
j=1 L j ·Ki, j,C3,i)
ê(∏κj=1 L j ·Ki, j,C2,i)
= ê(g,g)λi ê(g,g)wi ∑
κ
j=1 t j ê(ui,g)
wi ∑
κ
j=1 t j ê(ui,g)
wi fU j
Afterwards, the user chooses a set of constants
{ci}i∈[1,n] ∈ ZN such that ∑i ci~Ai = [1,0, · · · ,0]. Then, he
performs:
n
∏
i=1
rci =
n
∏
i=1
(ê(g,g)λi ê(g,g)wi ∑
κ
j=1 t j ê(ui,g)
wi ∑
κ
j=1 t j ê(ui,g)
wi fU j)ci
=
n
∏
i=1
ê(g,g)λici ê(g,g)∑
κ
j=1 t jwici ê(ui,g)
∑κj=1 t jwici
ê(ui,g)
fU jwici
= ê(g,g)∑
n
i=1 λici ê(g,g)∑
κ
j=1 t j ∑
n
i=1 wici ê(ui,g)
∑κj=1 t j ∑
n
i=1 wici
ê(ui,g)
fU j ∑
n
i=1 wici
We note that λi = ~A.~v and wi = ~A.~τ, where ~v.[1,0, · · · ,0]
= ∑ni=1 λici = s and ~w.[1,0, · · · ,0] = ∑
n
i=1 wici = 0.
In the sequel, the user gets the following result:
n
∏
i=1
rci = ê(g,g)s (4)
The data file DF is then obtained such as:
DF =
C0
∏ni=1r
ci
=
C0
ê(g,g)s
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The proof of correctness of the decryption algorithm is
detailed in Section VI-A.
D. System Inspection : INSPEC
The inspection procedure INSPEC carries out two determin-
istic algorithms. These algorithms are denoted by trace and
judge respectively and are defined as follows:
• trace – based on the signature Σ, the inspection authority
IA uses his secret key sins to extract the identity of the
related signer, based on Equation 5.
(
ê(g,σ2 ·σ
−sins
3 )
∏κj=1
ˆpkAA j
)
1
sins = ê(g,
κ
∏
j=1
ˇpkAA j)
H (Id) (5)
Then, the inspection authority uses a matching table in
order to retrieve an entry equal to ê(g,∏κj=1
ˇpkAA j)
H (Id).
In the sequel, IA returns the signer identity sid =
ê(g,∏κj=1
ˇpkAA j)
H (id) and a proof π attesting to this claim.
π is generated for the judge algorithm to check that the
tracing procedure is done correctly. In other words, this
algorithm double checks whether the user identity sid
has been produced properly with respect to the received
signature Σ.
• judge – the proof of validity of such an inspection pro-
cedure is done by proving that the decryption is correctly
performed, using the knowledge of the inspection secret
key sins. It outputs 1 if π is a valid proof that sid has
produced Σ or 0 otherwise. In other words, this algorithm
double checks whether the user identity sid has been
produced properly with respect to the received signature
Σ.
VI. SECURITY DISCUSSION
In this section, we prove the correctness of our Ins-PAbAC
construction (c.f. Section VI-A) and we discuss the resistance
of Ins-PAbAC against two adversaries, based on two realistic
threat models. We prove the security of our proposed scheme
with respect to the security model as defined in Section IV-C.
A. Correctness
We detail the correctness of our construction, with respect
to Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Authorized users can successfully authenticate
and decrypt enciphered data files.
We recall that cloud users have to collect their certified
attributes and the related secret keys from attribute authorities
AAs. As such, in Ins-PAbAC, only users, having valid private
keys related to their attributes, are able to access data stored
in the cloud, once successfully authenticated with the cloud
server. This is due to both the correctness of our decryption
and signature verification algorithms, asserted by Lemma 1
and Lemma 2 respectively and the compliance of the unforge-
ability property of the Ins-PAbAC signature scheme, inherited
from [58] and emphasized by Lemma 3.
In the following, we assume that there are κ involved
attribute authorities. Each attribute authority is responsible of
generate the secret key skS j related to the set of attributes S j,
such as S j ⊂ SU , ∑ j∈[1,κ] S j = SU and ψ(SU ) = 1.
Lemma 1. Data Decryption Correctness.
Proof. After receiving his attributes’ secret key skS j from
each involved attribute authority AA j, the authorized user first
computes:
r =
C1,i.ê(∏
κ
j=1 L j ·Ki, j,C3,i)
ê(∏κj=1 L j ·Ki, j,C2,i)
=
ê(g,g)λi .ê(∏κj=1 g
t j g fU j ui
t j ui
fU j ,gpgwiui
p)
ê(∏κj=1 g
t j g fU j ui
t j ui
fU j ,gpui p)
= ê(g,g)λi ê(g,g)wi ∑
κ
j=1 t j ê(ui,g)
wi ∑
κ
j=1 t j ê(ui,g)
wi fU j
Then, he computes the constants ci ∈ ZN such that ∑i ci ·~Ai =
[1,0, · · · ,0].
Note that λi = ~Ai ·~v where ~v = [s,v2, · · · ,vn] and wi = ~Ai ·~τ
such as~τ = [0,τ2, · · · ,τn]. Hence, we deduce that ∑
n
i=1 λici = s
and ∑i wici = 0. Consequently, the value ê(g,g)
s is derived as
follows:
n
∏
i=1
rci =
n
∏
i=1
(ê(g,g)λi ê(g,g)wi ∑
κ
j=1 t j ê(ui,g)
wi ∑
κ
j=1 t j ê(ui,g)
wi fU j)ci
=
n
∏
i=1
ê(g,g)λici ê(g,g)∑
κ
j=1 t jwici ê(ui,g)
∑κj=1 t jwici
ê(ui,g)
fU jwici
= ê(g,g)∑
n
i=1 λici ê(g,g)∑
κ
j=1 t j ∑
n
i=1 wici ê(ui,g)
∑κj=1 t j ∑
n
i=1 wici
ê(ui,g)
fU j ∑
n
i=1 wici
= ê(g,g)sê(g,g)0ê(ui,g)
0ê(ui,g)
0
= ê(g,g)s
Therefore, the data file DF can be obtained as follows:
DF =
C0
∏ni=1r
ci
=
C0
ê(g,g)s
Lemma 2. Authorized users can successfully authenticate to
the Cloud Service Provider.
Proof. When an authorized user wants to access outsourced
data, he has to provide a correct signature Σ, with respect to
the access policy ψ defined by the data owner, that has to be
verified by the CSP in an anonymous way.
If the generated signature Σ =
(xi∈{1,n},z j∈{1,κ},σ1,σ2,σ3,σ4) is a valid signature of
the message m for the predicate ψ, then both Equation 2
and Equation 3 hold. Subsequently, the CSP first verifies that
xi = σ
yi
3 where ~y ·
~A = [1,0, · · · ,0] and i ∈ [1,n]. Afterwards,
the CSP proceeds in verifying that Equation 2 holds as
follows:
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s = ê(g,σ1 ·σ2)
= ê(g,
n
∏
i=1
κ
∏
j=1
(ui
t j ui
fU j ui
t)yi gmrhmtht
κ
∏
j=1
gα j ht j ·ht jH (Id)hth fU j)
= ê(g,
κ
∏
j=1
gα j
κ
∏
j=1
ht jH (Id)+t(grht)m
κ
∏
j=1
n
∏
i=1
ui
(t j+t+ fU j)yiht j+t+ fU j)
= ê(g,
κ
∏
j=1
gα j)ê(g,
κ
∏
j=1
ht jH (Id)+t)ê(g,(grht))m
ê(g,
κ
∏
j=1
n
∏
i=1
ui
(t j+t+ fU j)yiht j+t+ fU j)
=
κ
∏
j=1
ê(g,g)α j ê(g,h)t jH (Id)+t ê(g,grht)m
κ
∏
j=1
n
∏
i=1
ê(g,ui
(t j+t+ fU j)yiht j+t+ fU j)
=
κ
∏
j=1
ê(g,g)α j ê(g,h)t jH (Id)+t ê(g,grht)m
κ
∏
j=1
n
∏
i=1
ê(g,ui
(t j+t+ fU j)yih(t j+t+ fU j)∑
n
i=1 µiyi)
=
κ
∏
j=1
ê(g,g)α j ê(g,h)t jH (Id)+t ê(g,grht)m
κ
∏
j=1
n
∏
i=1
ê(g,ui
(t j+t+ fU j)yih(t j+t+ fU j)µiyi)
=
κ
∏
j=1
ê(g,g)α j ê(gt j ,hH (Id))ê(g,h)t ê(g,grht)m
κ
∏
j=1
n
∏
i=1
ê(g(t j+t+ fU j)yi ,uih
µi)
=
κ
∏
j=1
ˆpkAA j z jσ4
m
n
∏
i=1
ê(xi,h
µi ui)
Note that µi = ∑
l
j=1 β jAi, j, the last equality is obtained by:
n
∑
i=1
µiyi(
κ
∑
j=1
t j + t + fU j) = (
κ
∑
j=1
t j + t + fU j)
n
∑
i=1
µiyi
=
κ
∑
j=1
(t j + t + fU j).1+0
=
κ
∑
j=1
t j + t + fU j
Lemma 3. Inspection Correctness.
Proof. The inspection authority uses his secret key sins to
deduce the signer identity of a given signature Σ. First, IA
uses the user’s signature to compute the equation 5 as follows:
r = ê(g,σ2 · (σ3)
−sins)
= ê(g,
κ
∏
j=1
M jh
t ·
κ
∏
j=1
(L jg
t)−sins)
= ê(g,
κ
∏
j=1
gα j ht j ht jH (Id)hth fU j
κ
∏
j=1
(gt j gtg fU j)−sins)
=
κ
∏
j=1
ê(g,g)α j
κ
∏
j=1
ê(g,gt jsins g fU jsins gt jH (Id)sinsgtsinsg−t jsinsg− fU jsins
g−tsins)
=
κ
∏
j=1
ê(g,g)α j ·
κ
∏
j=1
ê(g,gt jH (Id)sins)
=
κ
∏
j=1
ˆpkAA j ·
κ
∏
j=1
ê(g,g)t jH (Id)sins
=
κ
∏
j=1
ˆpkAA j ·
κ
∏
j=1
ê(g,gt j)sinsH (Id)
Subsequently, the inspector computes:
s
1
sins
∏κj=1
ˆpkAA j
= ê(g,
κ
∏
j=1
gt j)H (Id))
= ê(g,
κ
∏
j=1
ˇpkAA j)
H (id)
Finally, the inspection authority uses the matching table in
order to retrieve an entry equal to ê(g,∏κj=1
ˇpkAA j)
H (Id).
B. Indistinguishability
In the following proof, we prove that our Ins-PAbAC scheme
is CPA-Secure against static corruption of the attribute author-
ities with respect to Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. If Lewko et al. decentralized CP-ABE scheme
[11] is CPA-secure, then, our Ins-PAbAC scheme is selectively
CPA-secure such that AdvA [Exp
con f ] ≤ AdvA [Exp
Lewko], ac-
cording to Definition 1 with respect to the hardness of the
CDH assumption ( Definition 6).
Proof. We define a PPT algorithm adversary A running the
Expind security game defined in Section IV-C1 with an entity
B . This entity B is also running the Lewko et al’s CPA-security
game (Lewko-Game) with a challenger C . The objective of the
proof is to show that the advantage of the adversary A to win
the Expind game is smaller than the advantage of the entity B
to win Lewko-Game. Hereafter A , B and C interactions are
described, with A running the following steps and algorithms,
as specified in the Expind game:
Initialisation – in this phase, the adversary A gives the
algorithm B a challenge access structure Ψ∗ = (A∗,ρ∗).
Setup – B runs the setup to generate the public parameters.
For instance, it sets two multiplicative groups G1 and GT of
order N, a bilinear map ê : G1×G1 → GT , g a generator of
G1 and a collision resistant hash function H : {0,1}∗→ ZN .
Finally, it outputs the public parameters PP defined as PP =
{G1,GT ,N,H ,h, ê,u0, · · · ,uq}.
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In addition, B calls the challenger C to execute the
setupauth algorithm to generate the attribute authorities public
keys. Then, C chooses two random numbers α j, t j ∈ ZN .
Then, it generates the attribute authorities public keys {pkAA j}
defined as pkAA j = (ê(g,g)
αi ,gti). Finally, C sends to B the
attribute authorities public keys {pkAA j} which are sent next
by B to A .
Queries phase 1 – for each session k, the adversary issues
a key query by submitting a set of attributes S j and his
identity Id. Then, the algorithm B uses the challenger C to
generate and return the corresponding secret keys to the ad-
versary {skS j}k = {(M j,L j,Ki, j)}k. Afterwards, the challenger
C chooses fU j ∈ ZN and sets {skS j}k = {(M j,L j,Ki, j)}k =
{(gα j ht j h
fUj ht jH (Id),gt j g
fUj ,ui
t j ui
fUj )}k. The secret keys skS j
are returned to B who forwards them to the adversary A .
Challenge – the adversary A sends two different equal
length messages {M0,M1} ∈ GT to the algorithm B . This
latter chooses a bit b ∈ {0,1} and sends Mb to the challenger
C . Afterwards, C chooses a bit b ∈ {0,1} and encrypts
Mb under the challenge access structure Ψ
∗ = (A∗,ρ∗).
The challenger, in his turn, selects a random bit b ∈ [0,1]
and encrypts a message Mb ∈ {M0,M1} as the challenge
ciphertext EDb. To do so, it selects the random values
p,s,vi∈[1,l],wi∈[1,l] ∈ ZN . Then, it composes the vectors
~b = [s,v2, · · · ,vl ] and ~τ = [0,w2, · · · ,wl ] and computes the
shares λi = ~Ai ·~v and wi = ~Ai ·~w. The challenger computes the
challenge ciphertext as follows:



















C0b = Mbê(g,g)
s
C1,ib = ê(g,g)
λi
C2,ib = g
pui
p
C3,ib = g
pgwiui
p
Then, the challenger forwards the generated ciphertext EDb
to the adversary A .
Queries phase 2 – A continues to query a polynomially
bounded number of queries and B answers as in Queries
Phase 1, except that the adversary A can not query secret
keys related to a set of attributes which satisfy the access
policy Ψ∗ = (A∗,ρ∗).
Guess – the adversary A outputs a bit b′. Then, B sends b′
to C as its guess about b. If b′ = b, C answers 1 as the solution
to the given instance of the DBDH problem with respect to
Definition 6 as introduced in Lewko et al.’s security analysis
[11].
The adversary tries to guess the challenge ciphertext EDb
was generated using which message between the two chosen
plaintext messages M0 and M1. Hence, the adversary tries to
distinguish between C01 = M1ê(g,g)
s and C02 = M2ê(g,g)
s.
Concretely, considering the modified game detailed above, the
adversary must distinguish between C0 = ê(g,g)
s and C0 =
ê(g,g)T for T uniformly chosen random from ZN .
Likely to Lewko et al. scheme [11], we assume that the
adversary’s A view in the simulation (i.e. considering that
C0 = ê(g,g)
s ) is identically distributed to his view if C0 =
ê(g,g)T .
The adversary A outputs a bit b′. The probability to break
the instance of Expind game is smaller than the Lewko-Game,
as it is necessary for B to win the game for A to be able
to get the right EDb values, and try to guess the value of b.
As such Pr[ExpA
Lewko(1ξ)] ≥ Pr[ExpA
con f−real(1ξ)], and the
advantage of adversary A is negligible. Thus, our Ins-PAbAC
scheme satisfies the confidentiality property against the static
corruption of the attribute authorities.
C. Unforgeability
Our accountable Ins-PAbAC framework is considered to
be unforgeable if the signature scheme is unforgeable. For
instance, the user U is led to authenticate with the cloud in
order to get access to the encrypted files. As a consequence,
the unforgeability property of the Ins-PAbAC scheme is tightly
related to the unforgeability property of the used attribute
based signature.
In the following proof, we prove that our Ins-PAbAC scheme
is secure against chosen-message attack (UF-CMA) with re-
spect to Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. For any adversary A , against chosen-message
attack (UF-CMA), our Ins-PAbAC scheme is unforgeable ac-
cording to Definition 2 with respect to the hardness of the
CDH assumption ( Definition 5).
Proof. We consider an algorithm B that uses the adversary
A as a black-box and that solves the CDH problem. The
adversary A proceeds as follows:
Initialisation – in this phase, the adversary A gives the
algorithm B a challenge access structure Ψ∗ = (A∗,ρ∗).
Setup – B runs the setup to generate the public parameters.
For instance, it sets two multiplicative groups G1 and GT of
order N, a bilinear map ê : G1×G1 → GT , g a generator of
G1 and a collision resistant hash function H : {0,1}∗→ ZN .
Finally, it outputs the public parameters PP defined as PP =
{G1,GT ,N,H ,h, ê,u0, · · · ,uq}.
In addition, B calls the challenger C to execute the
setupauth algorithm to generate the attribute authorities public
keys. Then, C chooses two random numbers α j, t j ∈ ZN .
Then, it generates the attribute authorities public keys {pkAA j}
defined as pkAA j = (ê(g,g)
αi ,gti). Finally, C sends to B the
attribute authorities public keys {pkAA j} which are sent next
by B to A .
Queries phase – when the adversary requests H (Id) for
an identity Id for the first time, the challenger chooses a
random value rId ∈ZN and gives it to the adversary as H (Id).
It stores the value grId to the adversary. Thus, this latter
stores grId so that it can reply consistently to any subsequent
requests for H (Id). For each session k, the adversary issues
a key query by submitting a set of attributes S j and his
identity Id. Then, the algorithm B uses the challenger C to
generate and return the corresponding secret keys to the ad-
versary {skS j}k = {(M j,L j,Ki, j)}k. Afterwards, the challenger
C chooses fU j ∈ ZN and sets {skS j}k = {(M j,L j,Ki, j)}k =
{(gα j ht j h
fUj ht jH (Id),gt j g
fUj ,ui
t j ui
fU j )}k. The secret keys skS j
are returned to B who forwards them to the adversary A .
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In addition, the adversary is able to request the signature
of any message m under any access structure (A,ρ). Hence,
the challenger C computes the vector ~y such as ψ(SU ) = 1
and ~y · ~A = [1,0, · · · ,0]. Then, C chooses two random
values r, t ∈ ZN and executes the sign(PP,m,(A,ρ),{skS j}k)
algorithm and computes the signature Σ as follows:







































σ1k = ∏
n
i=1 ∏
κ
j=1[(K{ρ(i), j}k ui
t)]yi hmtgmrht
σ2k = ∏
κ
j=1 M jkh
t
σ3k = ∏
κ
j=1 L jkg
t
σ4k = ê(g,g
rht)
xik = [∏
κ
j=1 L jkg
t ]yi
z jk = ê(
ˇpkAA j ,h
H (id))ê(g,h)t
Forgery – the adversary A tries to forge a signature Σ∗
of a message m∗ while relying on several sessions. Obvi-
ously, A tries a forgery attack against the CDH assumption
(Definition 5) considering that σ1 is a product, over the set
of user’s attributes and involved attributes authorities, of a
randomization of the user’s secret keys. Knowing that this
randomization is required for deriving the remaining signature
elements, A must break the CDH assumption. Similarly, since
σ2 and σ3 are a randomization of the user’s secret keys, over
the set of involved attributes authorities, A is led to break the
CDH assumption. Moreover, A tries a forgery attack against
the CDH assumption to produce xi which is a randomized
product of the randomized user’s secret key, over the set of
involved attributes authorities. We state that the complexity of
the CDH assumption has been studied in [59] and it is proved
to be hard to solve (i.e. a (t,ε)CDH group is a group for which
the Exp(A , t) ≤ ε for every PPT adversary running in a time
t).
In the sequel, with respect to the hardness of the CDH
assumption, the adversary A cannot win the Expun f security
game with non-negligible advantage.
Thus, our Ins-PAbAC construction is unforgeable against the
chosen message attack.
D. Privacy
Based on an attribute based signature scheme, Ins-PAbAC
ensures users’ privacy against curious cloud service providers.
In our proposed scheme, the requesting data user has to
authenticate with the cloud provider. As such, U has to sign a
message received from the cloud service provider with respect
to the access structure defined by the data owner. The CSP
is responsible for verifying the user’s access rights without
knowing neither his identity nor the attributes used to sign the
message.
Ins-PAbAC inherits the privacy preserving property from the
Waters signature scheme [58].
Theorem 3. For any adversary A , against the privacy prop-
erty, our Ins-PAbAC scheme is computationally private accord-
ing to the Definition 3 with respect to the hardness of the CDH
assumption ( Definition 5).
Proof. We consider an algorithm B that uses the adversary
A which tries to distinguish between two honestly derived
signatures related to two different sets of attributes.
The privacy game begins when the challenger C executes
the Setup algorithm to generate the public parameters.
Setup – B runs the setup to generate the public parameters.
For instance, it sets two multiplicative groups G1 and GT of
order N, a bilinear map ê : G1×G1 → GT , g a generator of
G1 and a collision resistant hash function H : {0,1}∗→ ZN .
Finally, it outputs the public parameters PP defined as PP =
{G1,GT ,N,H ,h, ê,u0, · · · ,uq}.
In addition, B calls the challenger C to execute the
setupauth algorithm to generate the attribute authorities public
keys. Then, C chooses two random numbers α j, t j ∈ ZN .
Then, it generates the attribute authorities public keys {pkAA j}
defined as pkAA j = (ê(g,g)
αi ,gti). Finally, C sends to B the
attribute authorities public keys {pkAA j} which are next sent
by B to A .
Challenge phase – the adversary A chooses an access
structure ψ = (A,ρ), two sets of attributes S j1 and S j2 sat-
isfying the monotone access structure ψ = (A,ρ) such that
ψ(S j1) = ψ(S j2) = 1 and a message m and sends them to the
challenger C .
Afterwards, the challenger C picks a random bit
b ∈ {1,2} and executes the KeyGen algorithm such that
skS jb = Keygen(PP,{skAA j}, IdC ,S jb) = {(M j,L j,Ki, j)}b =
(gα jb ht jb h fU jb ht jb H (Id),gt jb g fU jb ,ui
t jb ui
fU jb ) and outputs the
signature Σb = sign(PP,m,(A,ρ),skS jb) as follows:







































σ1b = ∏
n
i=1 ∏
κ
j=1[(K{ρ(i), j}k ui
t)]yi hmbtgmbrht
σ2b = ∏
κ
j=1 M jkh
t
σ3b = ∏
κ
j=1 L jkg
t
σ4b = ê(g,g
rht)
xib = [∏
κ
j=1 L jkg
t ]yi
z jb = ê(
ˇpkAA j ,h
H (id))ê(g,h)t
Then, the signature Σb is sent to the adversary A as a
challenge signature.
Guess – the adversary A tries to guess which set of
attributes S j1 or S j2 was used to generate the signature Σb.
A outputs a bit b′ and wins the game if b′ = b.
As the two signatures are derived by the same user having
Id as identity for the same message m and with respect to the
same access structure Ψ, they are identically distributed using
the two sets of attributes.
For the attribute set S j1, the user’s secret key is skS j1 =
{(M j,L j,Ki, j)}1 = (g
α j1 ht j1 h fU j1 ht j1 H (Id),gt j1 g fU j1 ,
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ui
t j1 ui
fU j1 ). And, the user’s secret key generated based
on the attribute set S j1, is skS j2 = {(M j,L j,Ki, j)}1 =
(gα j2 ht j2 h fU j2 ht j2 H (Id),gt j2 g fU j2 ,ui
t j2 ui
fU j2 ).
As Ψ(S j1) = Ψ(S j2) = 1, obviously, we can prove that the
signature generated using the set of attributes S j1 ( in other
words, using the secret key skS j1 ) is similar to the signature
generated using the set of attributes S j2 (using the secret key
skS j2).
The adversary cannot distinguish the output of oracles better
than a flipping coin. As such, the probability of predicting b
is equal to 1
2
. Hence, the adversary A cannot deduce the set
of attributes used to generate the signature with respect to the
hardness of the CDH problem (Definition 5).
Intuitively, we can prove that an ABS signature created
using S j1 can also be generated using S j2. Thus, our proposed
Ins-PAbAC scheme is computationally private.
E. Anonymity Removal
As detailed in Section IV-C4, the anonymity removal prop-
erty aims at proving that there is no adversary that can (i) pro-
duce a signature while the inspection authority traces another
signing user; and (ii) generate a non-traceable signature which
has been successfully verified by the service provider. Recall
that the second requirement covers the resistance against
forgery attacks, discussed in subsection VI-C.
Theorem 4. Our Ins-PAbAC scheme satisfies the inspection
property under an anonymity removal attack with respect to
the Definition 4.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 4 consists on proving that an
adversary cannot generate a signature, that cannot be traced,
as detailed in the ExpAnR game. Indeed, an adversary A has
access to both secret keys and associated attributes of any
user (i.e., corrupted tracing authority). However, unlike the
unforgeability ExpUn f game, we assume that all attributes’
authorities are considered as honest.
Note that this assumption is required. In fact, if an attacker
is able to hold the private key of any attribute authority, he
would easily grant attributes/respective private key to dummy
users that results in an untraceable signature.
For this proof, we consider an algorithm B that uses the
adversary A as a black-box. The adversary A proceeds as
follows:
Initialisation – in this phase, the adversary A gives the
algorithm B a challenge access structure Ψ∗ = (A∗,ρ∗).
Setup – B runs the setup to generate the public parameters.
For instance, it sets two multiplicative groups G1 and GT of
order N, a bilinear map ê : G1×G1 → GT , g a generator of
G1 and a collision resistant hash function H : {0,1}∗→ ZN .
Finally, it outputs the public parameters PP defined as PP =
{G1,GT ,N,H ,h, ê,u0, · · · ,uq}.
In addition, B calls the challenger C to execute the
setupauth algorithm to generate the attribute authorities
public keys. Then, C chooses two random numbers
α j, t j ∈ ZN . Then, it generates the attribute authorities public
keys {pkAA j} defined as pkAA j = (ê(g,g)
αi ,gti). Finally, C
sends to B the attribute authorities public keys {pkAA j} which
are next sent by B to A .
Queries phase – when the adversary requests H (Id) for
an identity Id for the first time, the challenger chooses a
random value rId ∈ZN and gives it to the adversary as H (Id).
It stores the value grId to the adversary. Thus, this latter
stores grId so that it can reply consistently to any subsequent
requests for H (Id). For each session k, the adversary issues
a key query by submitting a set of attributes S j and his
identity Id. Then, the algorithm B uses the challenger C to
generate and return the corresponding secret keys to the ad-
versary {skS j}k = {(M j,L j,Ki, j)}k. Afterwards, the challenger
C chooses fU j ∈ ZN and sets {skS j}k = {(M j,L j,Ki, j)}k =
{(gα j ht j h
fU j ht jH (Id),gt j g
fU j ,ui
t j ui
fUj )}k. The secret keys skS j
are returned to B who forwards them to the adversary A .
In addition, the adversary is able to request the signature
of any message m under any access structure (A,ρ).
Output – the adversary generates a signature Σ∗ on a
message m∗ selected by the challenger, with respect to the
challenge access structure (A∗,ρ∗). The adversary wins the
ExpAnR game if Σ∗ is untraceable by the challenger C , relying
on the trace algorithm.
By absurd-um, let us suppose that an adversary A can win
the ExpAnR anonymity removal game. Indeed, two main key-
points are deduced. First, the inspection authority traces a
signature, produced by the adversary A during the anonymity
removal attack, on a new user U ′. To do so, A is led to know
the identity of the new user U ′, extract his private key and
generate a valid signature Σ related to U ′. In other words, the
adversary must win the unforgeability game which contradicts
the unforgeability property proved above in Section VI-C.
Second, the adversary can not compute a valid signature Σ
where the trace algorithm outputs an error message thanks
to Equation 3 of the verif algorithm.
As a consequence, the probability of winning the ExpAnR
game is negligible. Hence, our Ins-PAbAC scheme achieves
the inspection feature.
VII. THEORETICAL PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the computation and storage
complexities of our accountable Ins-PAbAC protocol. To this
end, we are interested in the computations performed at the
data owner side in order to execute the STORE procedure. In
addition, we will consider the computation cost related to the
execution of the BACKUP procedure by both the user (U) and
the cloud service provider (CSP).
In the following, we denote by:
• E1 : exponentiation in G1
• E : exponentiation in GT
• τP : computation of a pairing function ê
Table III details the performance comparison with most closely
related data sharing schemes in cloud environments. In addi-
tion, Table IV details the communication costs of Ins-PAbAC.
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TABLE III: Access Control Mechanisms in Cloud Data Storage Environments: Computation Cost Comparison
Scheme Data Owner Comp. CSP Comp. User comp. IA comp. Edge Server comp.
[28] E +(2n+1)E1 + τP nE1 +2(n+1)τP 2E1(n+1)+nE +(3+n)τP – –
[60] E +(2n+1)E1 + τP – (2+n)τP +nE – –
[48] (2n+1)E +(3n+3r)E1 + τP – (n+ r)E +2(n+ r)τP – –
[47] (2n+1)E +(5n+2+2nl)E1 + τP τP(3+n+ l)+(2nl +1)E1 2nτP +nE – –
[37] E +(5n+3+2nl)E1 + τP τP(3+n+ l)+(2nl +1)E1 (2n+1)τP +(n+1)E – –
[43] (2n+1)E +(5n+2+2nl)E1 + τP τP(3+n+ l)+(2nl +1)E1 2nτP +nE – –
[42] 3nE1 +(2n+1)E + τP −− 2nτP +nE – –
[61] (Delegated decryption) 6E1 +2ET +O(H ) – 4τp – ET +2O(H )
[51] (Delegated decryption) 5E1 +ET +3O(H ) – ET +3O(H ) – 3nτp +ET
[62] (Delegated decryption) (k−m+2+ r)E1 +E +1 tE1/(2t +2)E1 + τp 2τp +E1 +nE – E +2O(H )
Ins-PAbAC (n+1)E +5nE1 + τP (2+n)τP +(n+1)E1 (4n+6)E1 +(2n+κ+2)τP +(n+2)E E1 +2E + τp –
The STORE procedure consists of performing the encryption
algorithm encdata. During this procedure, the data owner has
to encrypt the data file. As such, he calculates one pairing
function ê(g,g) and nE exponentiations in G to compute each
of C1,i where n is the number of attributes. In addition, the
data owner executes 5n exponentiations in G1 to calculate
C2,i and C3,i. The BACKUP procedure is made up of three
algorithms, such that verif is executed by the cloud server
while sign and decdata are run by the data user (U). The user
first signs a random message in order to authenticate with the
cloud server. To sign the message, the user performs (4n+6)
exponentiations in G1, 2 exponentiations in G and (κ+2)τP
pairing functions. Then, this latter executes 2n pairing to
calculate ê(Ki ·L,C3,i) and ê(Ki ·L,C2,i) and n exponentiations
in G to decrypt the data file. In the verification phase, the CSP
executes the verif algorithm. As such, the cloud provider
performs (n+ 2) pairing functions’ computations and n+ 1
exponentiations in G1.
The access control schemes [42], [43], [47] are based on the
Lewko’s decentralized attribute based encryption scheme [11].
During the encryption phase, the data owner has to perform
one pairing function ê(g,g) and 2n exponentiations in GT to
calculate each of C1,i. In addition, to calculate C2,i and C3,i,
the data owner performs 3n exponentiations in G1. In the data
decryption phase, the data user performs n exponentiations in
GT and 2n pairing functions. Huang et al. [28] and Li et al.
[60] proposals consist of performing one exponentiation in GT ,
one pairing function and 2n+1 exponentiations in G1 in order
to generate the ciphertext. In the decryption process, 2 + n
pairing functions and n exponentiations in GT are performed.
The Zhao et al.’s proposal [37] is based on the use of the CP-
ABE scheme proposed by Bethencourt et al. [8]. To encrypt
the data file, the data owner performs (2n+1) exponentiations
in G1 and one exponentiation in GT . While decrypting data,
the user performs n + 1 exponentiations in GT and 2n + 1
pairing functions.
The proposals [43],[37], and [47] are based on the use of
the attribute based signature scheme proposed by [38]. In
order to sign the message, the user performs 2 + 3n + 2nl
exponentiations in G1, where n is the number of rows of the
access matrix A and l presents the number of columns of A. In
the verification phase, the CSP has to perform 3+n+ l pairing
functions and 2nl+1 exponentiations in G1. In Huang’s et al.
[28] proposal, the message’s signature requires the computa-
tion of 2(n+ 1) pairing functions. Besides, the CSP has to
compute 2(n+ 1) pairing functions and n exponentiations in
G1 to perform the signature’s verification.
Unlike most of the mentioned solutions above, our account-
able Ins-PAbAC framework introduces the accountability fea-
ture. Hence, to reveal a user identity, the inspection authority
IA performs one exponentiation in G1, one pairing function
and 2 exponentiations in GT .
As depicted by Table IV, the communications overhead of
Ins-PAbAC is acceptable in a cloud environment. Compared to
other state of the art schemes, Ins-PAbAC involves the inspec-
tion procedure which requires forwarding the access policy
and the signature to the inspection authority. Besides, during
the user’s authentication, the cloud server forwards a random
message which may be a short-sized message to be signed and
returned by the user. In addition, state of the art schemes use
two different access policies for signing (Ψencrypt ) and encrypt-
ing (Ψsign). Therefore, the communication overhead between
users and attributes authorities grows because they receive
two different sets of secret keys for signing and decrypting
{skS j}sign and {skS j}encrypt , respectively. However, Ins-PAbAC
requires only one access policy for both procedures, therefore
users receive only one set of secret keys to sign and decrypt
data.
In Table III, we reviewed some ABE schemes [51], [61],
[62] that support decryption delegation. In these schemes, the
data user delegates the decryption algorithm execution to an
edge server. This latter partially decrypts the ciphertext then
returns the result to the user who only executes few math-
ematical operations to retrieve the plaintext. This technique
can be applied to Ins-PAbAC as well in order to achieve less
computation overheads on the data user side.
Above all, the computation overheads of the accountable
Ins-PAbAC remain competitive while providing additional fea-
tures such as the accountability feature.
VIII. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the implementation results related
to our accountable Ins-PAbAC scheme. We conduct a number
of experiments to evaluate the overhead of the cryptographic
algorithms of the Ins-PAbAC scheme at the client side as
well as at the CSP side, namely: setup, setupauth, keygen,
encdata, sign, verif and decdata. Hence, we first present
the implementation context. Then, we analyse the Ins-PAbAC
performances.
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TABLE IV: Access Control Mechanisms in Cloud Data Storage Environments: Communication Cost Comparison
Operation Ins-PAbAC Scheme Communication Cost State of the Art Schemes Communication Cost [37], [28], [43] Ins-PAbAC’s Conference Version [10]
System Initialisation (|PP|+Ω× (|skAA|+ |pkAA|) bits (|PP|+Ω× (|skAA|+ |pkAA|) bits (|PP|+Ω× (|skAA|+ |pkAA|) bits
User Key Issuing (|Ω|× |n j|× |skS j |) (|Ω|× |n j|× ({|skS j}sign|+{|skS j}encrypt |)) bits (|Ω|× |n j|× |skS j |)
Data Storage (|CT |+ |Ψ|) bits (|CT |+ |Ψsign|+ |Ψencrypt |+ |Σ|+ |m|) bits (|CT |+ |Ψ|)
User Authentication (|Σ|+ |m|+ |Ψ|) bits – (|Σ|+ |m|+ |Ψ|) bits
System Inspection (|Σ|+ |Ψ|) bits – –
TABLE V: Performances of the Used Machines
Machine OS Processor Memory CPU
ASUS Ubuntu 12.04 Intel Core i7-5500U 8 GB 3 GHZ
DELL Ubuntu 12.04 Intel Core i5-3337U 4 GB 1.8 GHZ
0
50
100
80 112 128
Security Level (bits)
T
im
e 
(m
s)
KeyGen
Setup
Fig. 2: System Initialisation Procedure Computation Cost
Considering Different Security Levels
A. Context
The performances of our proposal are evaluated on a
simulated Ins-PAbAC framework, based on the OpenStack
Storage system (Swift) [12]. Our cryptographic algorithms
are implemented using the following cryptographic libraries:
Open-SSL [63], GMP [64] and Pairing Based Cryptography
(PBC) [65]. The measurements were conducted at the user and
cloud sides on two machines which properties are presented
in Table V. For our tests, we used 1000 samples for getting
the average durations.
B. Computation Cost Evaluation
In this section, we discuss the processing time of the
different algorithms depending on various parameters. In order
to evaluate the processing time of our proposed framework Ins-
PAbAC, we have implemented its different procedures such as
the system initialisation procedure, the data storage procedure
and the data backup procedure.
As the system initialisation procedure consists of setup,
setupauth and keygen algorithms, we have evaluated their
processing cost while considering different security levels (i.e.
80,112,128). In cryptography, the brute-force attack consists
in checking all possible keys until the correct one is found
(i.e; with a key of length S bits, there are 2S possible keys). S
is defined as the security level in symmetric cryptography. In
asymmetric cryptography, the security level of an algorithm
is defined with respect to the hardness of solving a math-
ematical problem such as the Discrete Logarithm Problem
(DLP). The time required to resolve the DLP problem is
much less important than trying the 2S keys by a brute-
force attack. That is why, public key cryptosystems must
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Fig. 3: System Initialisation Procedure Computation Cost
Considering Different Numbers of Attributes
be longer than symmetric algorithm keys. For example, a
1024 RSA key-length bits provides a 80 key-length equivalent
key of a symmetric algorithm. As shown in Figure 2, the
computation cost of the algorithms increases while increasing
the security level. Hence, under a security level equal to 128,
the processing cost of the setup algorithm is equal to 87 ms.
Moreover, the processing time of the combined setupauth and
keygen algorithms reaches 132 ms. Since the attribute based
encryption and signature schemes depend on the use of a set
of attributes, we focus on the time performance of the system
initialisation procedure while considering different number of
attributes. As depicted by Figure 3, the computation costs of
the setup, the setupauth and the keygen algorithms raise
linearly with the number of attributes used. For instance, we
use different numbers of attributes, 4, 10, 15, 20 and 25 to
evaluate the different algorithms. The computation costs of the
setup algorithm and the combined setupauth and keygen
algorithms begin by 11 ms and 12 ms, respectively, using
4 attributes, then they go up to 42 ms and 48 ms using 25
attributes. The data storage procedure is based on the execution
of the data encryption algorithm encdata. In this evaluation,
we studied the performance of the encdata algorithm while
varying the number of attributes. Hence, Figure 4 shows that
the encryption algorithm takes 20.87 ms using 4 attributes. The
computation overhead reaches 68.45 ms using 14 attributes.
Hence, the computation cost of the encdata algorithm in-
creases with the augmentation of the number of attributes.
As such, Ins-PAbAC presents an interesting processing cost
for resource constrained devices while providing fine grained
flexible access control.
The data backup procedure consists of the two different
layers mainly the anonymous user authentication and the data
retrieval procedures. We first perform the decryption algorithm
decdata while changing the number of involved attributes.
As depicted by Figure 4, the decdata algorithm requires
less than 10 ms using 4 attributes. However, its computa-
19
0
20
40
60
4 7 11 14
Number of Attributes
Ti
m
e 
(m
s)
decdata
encdata
Fig. 4: Computation Overhead of the Encryption and Decryp-
tion Algorithms
0
50
100
150
4 7 11 14
Number of Attributes
Ti
m
e 
(m
s)
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tion cost increases to reach 25.53 ms using 14 attributes.
Hence, Ins-PAbAC introduces an attractive computation cost,
especially for limited capacities devices. We can observe that
the difference between the encryption time and the decryp-
tion time is considerably noticeable due to the fact that the
encryption phase includes also the access structure generation
phase. Hence, to investigate the impact of the access structure
generation, we conduct experiments in order to evaluate its
computation cost as illustrated in Figure 5. We mainly note
that the average time needed to generate an access structure
increases with the number of attributes. The access structure
generation takes 154 ms while considering 14 attributes. We
can conclude that the processing overhead is very important
due to the heavy task of this algorithm which first takes as
input the set of attributes then defines the relation between
them.
In order to evaluate the performances of the anonymous
user authentication phase which is the second layer of the
data backup procedure, we examine the computation cost of
the sign and the verif algorithms ( cf. Figure 6) depending
on the number of attributes. The sign algorithm execution
takes less than 15 ms using 4 attributes and approximately 29
ms while increasing the number of attributes to 14.
Besides, the computation cost of the verif algorithm begins
by 10 ms and raises to 23.88 ms while involving 14 attributes.
We mainly notice that computation costs of the sign and
the verif algorithms increases along with the number of
attributes.
Above all, these computation overheads remain attractive
while providing a user anonymous authentication, flexible
access control and better security to outsourced data.
As our accountable Ins-PAbAC framework relies on the use
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Fig. 6: Computation Overhead of the Signature and Verifica-
tion Algorithms
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Fig. 7: Pairing Function Computational Cost
of bilinear maps as well as mathematical operations in a multi-
plicative group, we investigate the impacts of these operations
on the performances of our proposal while considering three
security levels (cf. Figure 7, Figure 9 and Figure 8 ). On
one hand, we choose to implement two symmetric pairing
functions mainly type A and type E as well as two asymmetric
pairing functions, type D and type G [65]. As shown in Figure
7, we notice that type A pairing function is slower than type D
pairing function respectively type E and type G. In addition,
the processing overheads of the different pairing functions
increase along with the security level. For instance, type A
pairing function requires 0.76 ms considering a security level
equal to 80, however, type D pairing function takes 03.23
ms under the same security level. Besides, while considering
a security level equal to 128, type A, type D and type G
pairing functions’ time durations are equal to 07.79ms, 22.6
ms and 72.46 ms, respectively. As such, the type of the pairing
function should be taken into account, while implementing a
cryptographic mechanism.
On the other hand, we evaluate the computation cost of mul-
tiplication and exponentiation operations as these elementary
operations are an important criterion to evaluate the system
performances.
Figure 9 and Figure 8 illustrate that the average time of
both multiplication and exponentiation operations increases
along with the security level. We must notice that these results
have been obtained while choosing type A pairing function and
fixing three security levels. First, the exponentiation requires
0.112 ms and 0.727 considering security levels equal to 80 and
128, respectively. Second, the multiplication overhead begins
from 0.001 ms while fixing a security level equal to 80 and
goes up to 0.003 ms considering a security level equal to 128.
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IX. CONCLUSIONS
With the emergence of distributed applications and the en-
forcement of several laws and regulations aiming at protecting
personal data, the main challenging concern is the design of
privacy preserving, efficient and secure access control schemes
to outsourced data contents on remote distributed servers.
This paper presented Ins-PAbAC, an accountable privacy
preserving attribute-based framework that relies on attribute
based cryptographic techniques for securely sharing out-
sourced data contents via public cloud servers. The proposed
framework ensures the confidentiality of outsourced data in
public untrusted cloud servers and defines efficient data shar-
ing in dynamic groups. That is, flexible access control poli-
cies are enforced among users belonging to separate groups
with different privileges. Moreover, Ins-PAbAC introduces the
accountability feature allowing an inspection authority to
reveal the user’s identity if needed. In addition, based on
formal system and security models, Ins-PAbAC is proven to
ensure strong security properties in the random oracle model,
namely confidentiality, unforgeability, privacy preservation and
anonymity removal. Through experimental evaluation built
upon OpenStack Swift testbed, Ins-PAbAC is proven efficient
in scalable data sharing, while considering the impact of the
cryptographic operations at the client side as well as at the
CSP side.
As future work, we aim at exploring decryption outsourcing
techniques to be applied on Ins-PAbAC in order to achieve a
reasonable computation cost at the data user side.
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